Live cryptographic proof

Provenance + PQC, actually firing.

Every value below is a real, unedited response from the EpochCore MCP gateway — captured 19 Jun 2026. Post-quantum seal, an append-only ledger that catches a one-byte change, a real zero-knowledge proof, and a backend that refuses to fabricate.

dkap_sealProvenance
D-KaP post-quantum seal

A four-node seal chain (K·D·V·Z). The Keymaster encapsulates a key with ML-KEM-1024 and self-tests the round-trip — the secret key is never returned or stored.

algorithmML-KEM-1024 · FIPS-203 self-testencapsulate→decapsulate roundtrip verified public key1568 bytes · pqc_safe: true secret keynot_returned_not_stored ras_root40668c787c463ca5 genesis437EC394E97ACCE9
pqc_quantum_hash_chainPQC
SHA3-512 hash chain

Append a block to a quantum-resistant hash chain — FIPS-202 SHA3-512, real backend.

algorithmSHA3-512 · FIPS 202 block0
data_sha3_512
GC9MkPfI6730RMoFEGidCfgFIE8kwGTc6Ah1tdhUr9FSdeBzyu4BNllmyrgWenTdDhz9nlQ8Xw3rAfN1pBvmcg==
worm/propose · listLedger · the test that matters
Seal it. Verify it. Catch a one-byte tamper.

Each artifact is content-addressed into an append-only ledger. Re-seal the identical artifact → the hash is identical (verified unchanged). Change a single field → a completely different hash (tampering caught instantly).

entry_idbb31c2c794e99721
Re-seal identical artifact  VERIFIED ✓ same hash
29bb522f30914c65097e241ec1576ae7
8967c5e8e9509a535bcf6b2f857ed312
One field changed  TAMPER ✗ different hash
24628453b990c020d865432fafbd917b
7f039e11ace63e504008aec8d3700ed0
qverifyZero-knowledge
Subset chain verification

A zero-knowledge subset proof over the seal chain — run by a live Python verifier, not a stub.

resultok ✓ chain_depth47 subset (k=5)[6, 16, 23, 28, 44] backendlive · quantum_verifier.py (202 LOC)
pqc_zero_knowledge_proofPQC
Real Schnorr zero-knowledge proof

Prove knowledge of a secret without revealing it — Schnorr / Ed25519 Fiat-Shamir over @noble/curves.

schemeschnorr_ed25519 real backendtrue · simulation: false
proof
vNT0wk1q2Uotuyn/zp3TFhGe5zNEjLfT8P8kzifzwAm3BDlGDVL7tUOZWGBlPhHP0f4zbTjYTWltWiVCBwDYAw==
watermark_seedLeak-tracing
Keyed mark, bound to the ledger

Derive the secret seed for an invisible, key-derived NDA watermark — cryptographically tied to a WORM entry, so one document's seed can't verify another. (The invisible image mark embeds offline.)

derivationsha256(RAS_ROOT | entry_id | qrng_seed) WORM entrya83ecf235511332a
seed_hex (bound to entry a83ecf23…)
d952cc1f3ca0ea5be99352753fe2a251a64b6d79e959851943e6a51d27323e84
pqc_credential_verifyHonesty by design
The backend refuses to fabricate

Hand the verifier a malformed credential and it rejects the input before any cryptographic primitive runs — no simulation, no fabricated "valid". The PQ signature suite it accepts:

Ed25519ML-DSA-87SLH-DSA-128f
honest_disclosure (verbatim)
"input rejected before any cryptographic primitive was invoked; no fabrication"